Abstract
Introduction
Windows Media Photo is a still image file format and compression algorithm for all types of continuous tone photographic images [2] .
HD Photo and Windows Media Photo both refer to the same file format, and are often used interchangeably. HD Photo is being made into a standard by the Joint Photographic Expert Group (JPEG) standards body, under the name JPEG XR [4] .
HD Photo differs in many ways from the wellknown and long-lived JPEG and Portable Network Graphics (PNG) formats. In contrast to JPEG, which only supports lossy compression, HD Photo offers both lossy and lossless compression.
For lossy compression, HD Photo represents a given image of better quality than the JPEG format at approximately half the file size. HD Photo provides a high rate of compression while retaining much of the image's original quality. In addition, by storing 16 or 32 bits of data for each color (compared to 8 data bits per color for JPEG), it is easier for someone to distinguish subtle variation in tone or shadow details for a given image.
Like the PNG format, HD Photo can store the full information of an image taken directly from a digital camera's sensor (i.e., the image's "full dynamic range and color gamut data") [5] . Unlike the PNG format, HD Photo can store a high-grade image at or near its original quality in a smaller amount of space than the PNG format [5] . HD Photo supports storage of the raw data from the digital camera's sensors [10] . In addition, the file format can be downloaded directly from the digital camera and stored on a computer without the burden of photo maintenance and large memory requirements for processing raw images.
High dynamic-range photography (HDR) can capture significantly more image information than JPEG. Digital cameras are currently being developed that can directly create an HDR image. With current technology, a user must take "a series of shots with different exposures" and then concatenate them together into a composite image to make an image of equal quality [1] . HD Photo supports 32-bit HDRs [1] . These and other features such as efficient decoding for multiple resolutions and low overhead for format conversion or transformations make HD Photo appealing compared to other image file structures [6] .
HD Photo is well positioned to become one of the dominant image formats in part because Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Mac OS X support the file format. Moreover, Microsoft has made a device porting kit available to manufacturers so they can "add HD Photo support in devices and to other platforms" [9] . In addition to the JPEG XR effort to make HD Photo an international standard, Microsoft loosened restrictions on its licensing policy and added the HD Photo technology under the Open Specification Promise [10] .
The possibility of HD Photo being the eventual successor of the JPEG format makes HD Photo makes it of interest to investigate whether HD Photo's file structure is vulnerable to carrying a malicious payload or carrying hidden information within its metadata, and whether the image viewer applications used today are vulnerable to exploitation via HD Photo. If image viewer applications are vulnerable to such exploits, then the follow-on research question is: What are the countermeasures that someone can take to lessen or eliminate the vulnerabilities? During our investigation of HD Photo there were no reported vulnerabilities of HD Photo in the open literature, nor were there any reports of software tools or methodologies that have been tailored for discovering or exploiting vulnerabilities in HD Photo.
In this paper we describe how we used an automated toolset to conduct both mutation-and generation-based fuzzing to uncover vulnerabilities in image viewer applications that accept HD Photo image files. The results of exercising the test cases indicate that the image viewer applications are highly resistant to easy-to-find security bugs often discovered by fuzzers.
Fuzzing
Fuzzing is a type of black-box testing. A fuzzer generates input for the target software to consume, then logs the results of any failures that occur. The fuzz tester attempts to determine what bug caused a particular failure, and what category that specific bug falls under. If it is a security bug, the fuzz tester tries to determine whether the bug is exploitable.
The software targeted by a fuzzer is a parser. A parser is "a set of code that takes data as input and converts it to a form that a program can use. This often means deserializing binary or text data formats into structures or classes that a program can interpret easier" [7] . In general, parsers analyze data structures, and fall into one of the following categories: file format, network protocol, and miscellaneous. The focus of our study is on fuzzing file format parsers because these parsers handle graphic image formats and executable files.
In file-format fuzzing, the desired result "is to find an exploitable flaw in the way that an application parses a certain type of file" [11] . File-format fuzzing is typically narrow in scope, with most targets being client-side applications such as image viewers, web browsers, media players, and office productivity suites [11] . Since these targets are often on the client-side, file format fuzzing can be performed on a single host.
Discovering successful file format attacks tends to be more of an art than a science, as evidenced by the trial-and-error process commonly used in file-format fuzzing. Generation-and mutation-based fuzzing are the main methods used in fuzzing file formats. According to [11] , applying fuzzing to local applications that handle file formats is relatively easy. The typical file fuzzer performs the following steps: (i) prepare a test case, either via mutation or generation; (ii) launch the target application and instruct it to load the test case; (iii) monitor the target application for faults, typically with a debugger; (iv) in the event a fault is uncovered, log the finding, or if after some period of time no fault is uncovered, manually kill the target application; and (v) repeat steps (i) through (iv).
Security faults in file-parsing applications fall into several categories of vulnerabilities [11] : denial of service (DoS), integer handling problems, simple stack/heap overflows, logic errors, format strings, and race conditions.
When it comes to fuzzing of image-viewer applications, the first step is to identify the target format, in our study it is HD Photo. The next step is identifying the target application or software, which for our study is image-viewer applications that are compatible with the HD Photo image format.
The fuzzer we built to conduct security testing generates HD Photo images. Determining if the fuzzing is successful in triggering the application behavior requires attaching a debugger to the target application to determine which exceptions have occurred during testing. Once the required components have been acquired for the fuzzing tool, the next step is to identify specific fuzzing strategies for the file format. For mutation-based fuzzing, a good starting point is a walkthrough, or handtrace, of a HD Photo image.
Development of the Toolset
We used the results of conducting a detailed handtrace of a sample valid HD Photo image as a guide for constructing a fuzzing blueprint for the HD Photo file format [3] . In turn, the blueprint was used to guide the development of test cases for use with mutation-or generation-based fuzzing. Regarding the mutationbased fuzzing aspect, it would be easy to just perform dumb fuzzing on this file format, but it would be of greater benefit if we have some test cases to perform smart fuzzing instead of just randomly manipulating data across a valid HD Photo file.
For mutation-based fuzzing, the first step is to take a completely valid HD Photo image and use it as a foundation to build use cases on top of it. The key is to start with a well formed HD Photo file and find ways to malform the file in such a way that we can conduct boundary-value analysis. The resulting file should be sufficiently compliant with the HD Photo specification to avoid trivial rejection, yet at the same time it should sufficiently violate the specification in hopes of evoking unintended behavior from the target application [7] .
To create a semi-valid HD Photo file, we can start by keeping fields that are scrutinized by hard checks, such as the first three bytes of the HD Photo File Header (0x4949BC) and the mandatory GDI signature "WMPHOTO" of the Image Header in the HD Photo Bitstream. Thus, all our test cases should have these values built in.
It is of little benefit to exclusively use dumb fuzzing (i.e., completely random input); almost all of the test cases will be invalidated by the target application. A better strategy, and the one that we applied, is to start with a valid image, manipulate parts of the file, and send the resulting semi-valid file as input to the target application. Using this approach we employed both mutation-and generation-based techniques to fuzz HD Photo image files.
Dumb Fuzzing Test Cases
Using the aforementioned blueprint, we developed the following test cases for dumb fuzzing:
Case 1: Supply the parser with a truncated file. Case 2: Replace a randomly-selected range of bytes inside the file with random values including filling the entire file with random data and filling portions of the file with random data.
Case 3: Find an ASCII string value inside the Image File Directory (IFD) and replace it with an unexpected value. This includes searching for nullterminating strings (in ASCII and Unicode) and setting the trailing null to non-null.
Case 4: Toggle the most significant bits of a series of bytes inside the file. This includes toggling, setting, or clearing high bits (e.g., 0x80, 0x8000).
Case 5: Use random values to perform an exclusive OR (XOR) on a random range of bytes in the file.
Case 6: Switch adjacent bytes inside the file.
Smart Fuzzing Test Cases
Using the aforementioned blueprint, we developed the following test cases for smart fuzzing:
Case 1: Fuzzing the value of the Version Number in the HD Photo File Header to test how the application handles a HD Photo file with a future version (> 2).
Case 2: Fuzzing the number of entries in the IFD. Case 3: Fuzzing the offset to the PixelFormat field in the IFD. This value is mandatory in HD Photo, and it indicates the offset where the parser can find the unique pixel format of the rendered image. Case 10: Fuzzing the contents of the IFD ImageOffset field (image data offset) to test the parser's ability to determine if an offset provided to the image data contains a valid HD Photo Bitstream.
Case 11: Fuzzing the contents of the IFD ImageByteCount field (i.e., the image data in bytes). This value is mandatory in HD Photo, and it indicates the length of the image data in bytes. This could possibly be used by an image viewer application in prematurely expecting the number of bytes it should read from the HD Photo Bitstream.
Case 12: Fuzzing the contents of the IFD offset to next IFD (instead of the four trailing null bytes), to test the parser's ability to determine if a non-zero offset provided to the next IFD actually contains a valid secondary IFD. 
Generation-Based Fuzzing Test Cases
Based on the walkthrough results, we developed the test cases listed below for use with generation-based fuzzing of the HD Photo file format. Unless otherwise noted, the physical portions of the HD Photo file that are not mentioned in a specific test case can be assumed to be unmodified, with the exception of the actual image data located after the Tile Layer in the HD Photo Bitstream (because it contains the Macroblock and Block layers). The test cases are developed using a 198-byte sample image as the foundational blueprint (i.e., the template) for generation-based fuzzing. For example, for the first test case described (using a version number other than zero or one in the HD Photo File Header), just the third byte in the 198-byte image is changed for that fuzzed file, and the rest of the file is left unchanged (with the exception noted above for the actual image data).
Case 1: Insert an incorrect version number-any number greater than one in the third byte of the file.
Case 2: Omit one of the mandatory IFD tags (e.g., PixelFormat and ImageWidth) required by any HD Photo file in order to be considered "valid." There are at least seven mandatory IFD entries used by HD Photo. Fuzz testing should center on how the image viewer application handles mandatory IFD entries and optional IFD entries.
Case 3: Make all IFD tags semi-valid by fuzzing the value field.
Case 4: Generate a file with an invalid GDI signature (i.e., a signature that is not equal to the ASCII string "WMPHOTO"), for testing whether the parser validates the HD Photo Bitstream. Case 6: Set the number of directory entries in the IFD to a random value.
Case 7: Set the ImageWidth and ImageHeight IFD tags so they are not in ascending order.
Case 8: Have at least one IFD Entry with Type set to FLOAT (IEEE format), but set the value of the tag to a random value which may be valid or invalid.
Case 9: Randomly generate values for each of the IFD tag's data Type.
Case 10:
Have the first IFD advertise an offset to a second IFD, even though only one IFD exists in the file. This case reveals how the parser handles file that does have a non-zero offset after the first IFD, but does not contain a valid IFD at that location. Not handling this exception properly may result in a dangling pointer (or an invalid pointer reference) in the application's execution. A variation of this test case is: Generate a file with the offset to the next (second) IFD pointing to the beginning of the first IFD; this tests whether the parser goes into an infinite loop.
Case 11: Remove the Image File Directory. Case 12: Set the BITSTREAM_FORMAT syntax element, even though the sample image has this element originally set to zero. This tests a parser's ability to handle a file which advertises that the image is laid out in Frequency mode, even though the image itself was created in Spatial mode.
Case 13: Set the alpha channel flag syntax element, even though the sample image has this element originally set to zero. This tests a parser's ability to handle a file which advertises that it has an alpha channel present in its bitstream, even though the image itself does not have such a channel. Case 19: Set the tiling flag even though the sample image does not use tiling.
Case 20: For the Image Plane Header set CLR_FMT equal to 7, which is reserved (the current version of HD Photo should not have a value of 7).
Toolset and Image Viewer Applications
We used a general file format fuzzer, providing for ease of modifying the fuzzing toolset for use with different target parsers.
Most fuzzing frameworks used today are built for testing network protocols, particularly with web browsers and web servers as the primary targets, and are intended for use with UNIX operating systems. We selected the Windows-based fuzzing framework skeleton called "MiniFuzz" as the foundation on which to build our customized fuzzer. Two of the reasons why this fuzzing toolset was chosen were its userfriendliness on the Windows XP and Vista platforms, and that fact that the image viewer applications chosen for security testing all run on Windows operating systems, which can be readily launched by MiniFuzz. MiniFuzz is written in C++ and compiled using the Visual Studio .NET 2005 integrated development environment (IDE). The IDE helped us manage the multiple C++ header and source files within the MiniFuzz framework. Moreover, the framework can be filled in with the fuzzing test cases to be executed for each of the parsers under test. The MiniFuzz skeleton can be extended to perform generation-based fuzzing. Other test cases can be added by using the template of the fuzzing toolset.
At 
Test Procedure
The fuzzer is first given a target image viewer application and a directory containing a set of valid HD Photo image files. At the start of an iteration the fuzzer selects at random whether to do generation-or mutation-based fuzzing. If the fuzzer selects generation-based fuzzing, a semi-valid HD Photo file is generated based on at least one of the generationbased fuzzing test cases. If mutation-based fuzzing is selected, the fuzzer will select a random HD Photo file in the provided file directory, which is then mutated in some fashion (based on a randomly selected mutationbased fuzzing test case). After producing the fuzzed HD Photo file, the fuzzer then spawns an instance of the target application and observes how it consumes the fuzzed file. If the malformed file causes an exception, the fuzzer saves that file in a folder created inside the directory that contains the set of valid HD Photo files. The fuzzing toolset names this folder "badfiles" and it contains any fuzzed HD Photo file created by the fuzzer that caused an exception in the target application. Any file which causes the target application to fail can be saved for further investigation; otherwise it is deleted.
Our HD Photo fuzzing toolset is capable of monitoring for exceptions because it acts as a minidebugger itself through the use of debugging APIs. Regardless of whether the fuzzed file succeeds in causing the target application to fail, the results are logged by the fuzzer (including the name of the fuzzed file and the time of creation). The process is then repeated until the user of the toolset stops the testing.
Using the MiniFuzz framework as its foundation, the HD Photo fuzzing toolset's C++ header and source files are compiled as a project in the Visual Studio 2005. The result is an executable called "MiniFuzz" which takes two arguments: (i) the name of the image viewer application to be tested and (ii) the name of the directory that contains the library of valid HD Photo files to be used in mutation-based fuzzing.
We created a library of valid HD Photo image files for use with mutation-based fuzzing of the HD Photo images. The library consists of JPEG image files downloaded from online sources and then converted into HD Photo format using the Geekpedia tool 4 .
The fuzzing toolset was run against each of the three image viewer applications, using the previously described combined approach of mutation-based fuzzing and generation-based fuzzing. With all the test cases incorporated into the fuzzing tool, the tool was then run against each application for twenty-four hours to ensure that the many variations of each test case (for both types of fuzzing) were executed.
Results
For all of the test runs, all of the fuzzed HD Photo files created by the fuzzer were either accepted by the target application or rejected outright. None of the malformed files caused an exception in any of the parsers that was worth investigating. We repeated the test runs for each parser, yielding identical results. To ensure that the results were not an artifact of defects in the fuzzing toolset itself, we disabled the mechanism that deletes all the fuzzed files that failed to cause the application to crash and verified the correctness of the file contents using the XVI32 hex editor.
Multiple test runs were then conducted against each of the target applications to check for security bugs. Modifications were made for some of the test runs, such as temporarily disabling generation-based fuzzing in the fuzzer so that only mutation-based fuzzing was conducted (and vice versa) and lengthening the period of time allowed for the fuzzer to run. Despite such measures, the target parsers did not crash.
The fuzzer toolset was run once again, this time with the deletion of failed malformed files toggled off. We checked a large sample of these malformed files by manually opening them with the image viewer applications, with no difference in the results.
The range of values for vital fields such as the width and height of the image are set such that the possible values assigned to these fields are always at or between the absolute minimum and absolute maximum values, preventing the situation of setting these elements to a zero or negative value, and hence avoiding vulnerabilities with signed integer overflow.
HD Photo image viewer applications would most likely store the image data of an HD Photo file through the allocation of buffers, so corrupting the image's height and width values would have been one of the best ways to attack this file format. Since the size of the buffers allocated by the target application would likely depend on the advertised height and width of the HD Photo image, it would be ideal to attempt the trigger of an integer overflow or buffer overflow by fuzzing the WIDTH_MINUS1 and HEIGHT_MINUS1 syntax elements. This is especially true for the Windows Vista's image viewer application, which exhibited somewhat unexpected behavior when opening one of the malformed files.
For Windows Photo Gallery in Windows Vista Business Edition (out of the box with no security updates installed), the closest that a malformed file came to causing that application to deviate from its normal behavior was when the fuzzer took the "msnlogo.wdp" image file and set each of the WIDTH_MINUS1 and HEIGHT_MINUS1 syntax elements in the HD Photo Bitstream to the hexadecimal value 0xBFFF, even though the ImageWidth and ImageHeight IFD container tags advertised values of 29 and 28 pixels, respectively. Several hours after opening the file, Windows Photo Gallery finished rendering a garbled image from the file. In practice, if opening a file using an application results in a memory-or CPU-usage spike, this "would indicate that malicious data could cause a denial of service" for this application [12] . For Windows Photo Gallery, handling the malformed file resulted in 100% CPU usage and a significant spike (45%) in usage of physical memory, which continued to slowly but continually increase. Other high values were used in place of 0xBFFF for both WIDTH_MINUS1 and HEIGHT_MINUS1 (e.g., 0xFFFE and 0x7FFF), with similar results when Windows Photo Gallery tried to open the file.
Windows Photo Gallery's handling of the malformed "msn-log.wdp" file consumed a lot of resources on Windows Vista. However, it did not cause the application to hang, since the user still has control of Windows Photo Gallery, such as selecting the option to view the next picture in the current directory. What this observation tells us about Windows Photo Gallery is that it is consuming far more resources than usual to process the malformed HD Photo file, which causes the operating system to slow down to a crawl: This is due to the amount of memory that Windows Photo Gallery has allocated in anticipation of loading this image file because of the altered values for the WIDTH_MINUS1 and HEIGHT_MINUS1 syntax elements. Replacing the actual values of both the image width and height syntax elements of a HD Photo file with a large enough value appears to be the main culprit for both the memory spike and CPU spike when Windows Photo Gallery attempts to open that file: there is a possibility for a denial of service (DoS) attack if one can craft a HD Photo file that (when opened) results in Windows Photo Gallery causing Windows Vista to run slowly.
The malformed file was also opened using the other Paint.NET and XnView. On opening "msn-logo.wdp" and observing the Paint.NET application (this time running on Windows Vista Business, to compare performance with Windows Photo Gallery) after thirty to forty seconds, the application displayed an error message: "Not enough memory to load the image." This error corroborates the earlier claim that Windows Photo Gallery behaved the way it did because it allocated a large amount of memory to load the malformed file. While loading the image, Paint.NET also consumed 100 percent of the CPU and a significant amount of memory. However, Paint.NET released the CPU and memory resources when it stopped its attempt to load the malformed file after thirty to forty seconds, and informed the user of the error: Paint.NET aborted the process of opening the malformed file cleanly. Similarly, on attempting to open "msn-logo.wdp", XnView informs the user that the program needs to quit and then exits cleanly.
The results indicate that the target applications' software conforms to good coding practices for parsing file formats. For instance [2] cautions implementers to perform a data-pointer check for structures such as pointers to IFD entries in HD Photo in order to avoid pointer-error bugs (e.g., having two pointers that reference the same location in memory), in addition to read a certain file format unambiguously, which can be implemented in HD Photo via the PixelFormat IFD tag. Attempts to fuzz the value provided in the PixelFormat IFD entry either resulted in the fuzzed file being rejected by the target parser, or the parser being able to render the image successfully.
The security likely rests on the implementation of HD Photo (e.g., managed code such as .NET Framework 3.0) and on the image viewer applications that handle the image. This includes performing the necessary input validation routines to correctly identify valid HD Photo image files and reject invalid (and possibly malformed) images. The managed code that the Windows operating system uses to handle and render HD Photo uses a virtual machine to execute code instead of passing it to the kernel itself: This allows for checking to ensure that malicious code is not executed on behalf of the current user.
Conclusion
Malicious users will need to go to great lengths, most likely via reverse engineering, to find an exploitable vulnerability in HD Photo. HD Photo image viewer applications should not trust any fields inside a binary structure: Software engineers should design parsers that can handle a large number of variations of a binary of a given file format, without deviating from its intended specification. Programmers can keep the source code simple enough so that it will "accept only valid input (and) deny all variants" [8] . The risk of malicious use of HD Photo will increase as web browsers are updated to render and display images of the HD Photo file format and malicious nonexecutable files (i.e., malformed images) can be disseminated widely and expeditiously via the Web.
